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The emergence of an African middle class in the South
African bantustans has been the source of considerable
debate during the 1980s. Few contributors to this debate
dispute the fact that the bantustan programme has created
opportunities for black 'embourgeoisement1 in rural areas.
What is contested, however, is the economic and political
significance of this process. Some authors argue that the
Apartheid state, as a representative of the interests of
white capital, has been extremely reluctant to commit itself
wholeheartedly to the project of black middle class
formation and has focused on the narrower project of black
political 'encadrement1 (Noluntshungu 1982). The other
position in this debate has been that black middle class
development has gained considerable momentum during the
bantustan era, and that this process has been an integral
part of the state's programme of ethnic national development
(Southall 1980; Saul and Gelb 1981; Sarakinsky 1989).
These differences in approach have generated conflicting
interpretations of the political orientations of bantustan
elites. According to the former analysts, the ambivalence of
the Apartheid state towards black economic development has
driven a wedge between rural elites and the white state, and
has encouraged the latter constantly to seek alliances with
the black working class with whom they share a common
experience of racial oppression. The second group of
analysts, by contrast, suggest that in view of the economic
assistance afforded rural elites by state agencies, there
has been an inevitable convergence of interests between the
white state and bantustan elites. One recent study goes as
far as to suggest that the liberation movements, such as the
ANC, should not underestimate the counter-revolutionary
potential of these rural 'collaborators' (Josana 1989).
But, despite the influence of these analyses, they have
recently come under fire from various quarters. One line of
criticism has been that these perspectives assume that rural
middle class formation has been far too homogeneous.
Ritchken (1989), for instance, argues that one cannot simply
assume that diverse groups of elites, such as chiefs,
landowners, traders, and bureaucrats, will share the same
social identities and political interests. Mare and Nchune
(1989) follow a similar line of criticism by arguing that we
need to sub-divide the rural petty bourgeoisie into its
'bureaucratic core' and 'other fringe elements'. Both
studies suggest that the notion of an undifferentiated petty
bourgeoisie provides few clues to the increasingly complex
dynamics of rural politics. Another approach to the same
problem is to see bantustan elites as submerged in a variety
of cross-cutting political tendencies and loyalties which
generate highly ambiguous relations of dependency to the
white state (Charney 1988; Graaf 1990).
Although these new approaches are more sophisticated and
eclectic than earlier structuralist analyses, they have not
challenged the state-centred view of rural class formation,
which stands at the core of the perspectives they seek to
criticise. Upward social mobility is still conceived of as a
political relationship negotiated through the conduit of the
bantustan-central state structures. In GraafJs (1990) words:
'the state still provides the most important, if not the
only lever, for economic advancement in rural areas'. In the
final analysis, he suggests, access to wealth in rural areas
is not determined as much by the 'relationships to the means
of production' as by access to state position. And for this
reason, he argues, people continue to aspire to government
jobs in the bantustans (1990: 170). Now, while one need not
dispute the last statement, it would be misleading to assume
that class differentiation has occurred solely through state
structures. To accept this proposition is, I believe, to
deny the existence of alternative material and social bases
for rural entrepreneurship.
My aim in this paper is to attempt to re-focus debate on
rural entrepreneurship by drawing attention to the variety
of forms of entrepreneurship evident in the Qwaqwa bantu-
stan. I will suggest that, while access to state funds and
position has been, and continues to be, an important
launching pad for the accumulation of wealth in this area,
it has by no means been the only, or even the dominant, form
of entrepreneurial response in this area. In seeking out the
alternative social and economic underpinning of entrepre-
neurial strategies I direct attention away from the state
and associated patronage networks and focus on the role of
indigenous resources and ideologies in propping up local
market responses. My central argument is that the economic
strategies of the vast majority of rural entrepreneurs in
Qwaqwa have been shaped around household, rather than state,
resources, and are better intepreted as forms of resistance,
rather than collaboration.
In developing my analysis, I draw inspiration from the work
of Szelenyi (1988) on rural Hungarian entrepreneurs under
socialism. He argues that one cannot understand entrepre-
neurship in the Hungarian countryside without exploring its
social and cultural underpinnings, or its status as a
peculiar form of resistance to the command economy. There
are important insights in this analysis which provide the
basis for a re-interpretation of 'embourgeoisement* in rural
South Africa. The second body of literature I refer to deals
with the micro-level circuits of domestic relations and
household ideologies. The relevance of this literature for a
study of class is that it draws attention to domestic units
as social and cultural repositories, which are often able to
adapt and respond to change on their own terms. In exploring
the social and cultural underpinnings of entrepreneurship in
this-way, I hope, by the end of the paper, to have provided
new insights into the thorny issues of class and identity in
rural South Africa.
2. Relocation and Market Anarchy:
the structural context
In setting out the structural limits of entrepreneurship in
dependent economies, scholars devoted much attention to the
International Labour Organisation's (1972) report on the
'informal sector1 in Kenya. Many have argued that far from a
panacea for unemployment and poverty, this sector should be
seen as an exploited enclave in the wider capitalist
economy. The gist of their argument is that in peripheral
capitalist economies, small-scale business operators can
never survive the dominating tendencies of large, estab-
lished concerns. In this context it is postulated that the
small-scale sector will increasingly, with the expansion of
capitalism, be confined to economic involution and will
serve little purpose other than to reproduce a labour force
for the dominant economic order (Leys 1978; Sandbrook 1982).
The influence of these arguments has been powerfully felt
in South Africa where capitalist relations are seen to be
highly developed. Wilkinson and Webster (1982), for example,
conclude on the basis of a survey of the informal sector in
Soweto that these operators are destined to a life of
poverty in the 'interstices of capitalism1. This perspective
has been frequently rehearsed for bantustans. Sharp and De
Waal (1988), for instance, argue that economic development
in these areas will be much better served by raising urban
wages than by stimulating the already involuted and under-
capitalised informal sector. The function of this literature
has been to reinforce prevailing notions of state-driven
class formation in the bantustans. Most of these studies
identify two sectors: the state-supported petty bourgeoisie
and the involuted informal sector.
Without completely rejecting this analysis, it needs to be
pointed out that this presentation of the small-scale sector
in the bantustans is misleading because it over-estimates
the power of the state/capital within these economies. In
addressing economic developments in the bantustans, it is
Vworth repeating a point made by Long and Roberts (1984) in
their study of rural entrepreneurs in Peru:
...the emphasis on the functionality of the informal
sector for capital accumulation requires an important
rider when applied to provincial centres...The small-
scale sector is less likely to be controlled directly
by its linkages with the large-scale sector, because
these centres are not significant locations for
productive investment and accumulation (198-4: 144).
These authors go on to argue that conditions in the Peruvian
highlands in the 1970s enabled small-scale entrepreneurs to
achieve sustained success if they were able to manipulate
household resources and kinship as a basis for economic
diversification (1982: 144). This observation provides an
useful starting point for our analysis of Qwaqwa, where the
intrusion of 'outside' (white) capital in local markets has
been surprising slow and uneven.
In the 1960s Qwaqwa, or Witsieshoek as it was known, was
defined by its position as a supplier of migrant labour
to the South African urban economy. As a rural backwater,
Witsieshoek displayed the classic symptoms of an under-
developed labour reserve. In the 1960s the bantustan had no
industrial base, despite efforts by the apartheid state to
create one. In the field of commerce and agriculture it also
lagged far behind adjacent regions, and even many of the
other bantustans. This was a result of the domineering
tendencies of the Bantu Investment Corporation within the
local economy. In Witsieshoek the BIC was distinguished by
its obstructionist, rather than creative role, in stimu-
lating class differentiation (Bank 1988). In fact, by 1970
there was no evidence of the rise of a stable middle class
in Qwaqwa, and when this process did occur, it took place in
a context of rapid social change and economic instability.
The major cause of this instability was mass population
relocation, which took place in Qwaqwa at an astonishing
pace from 1970 onwards. In the years 1970 to 1975 the local
population quadrupled from 24 000 to over 100 000. A mere
four years later it had doubled again and by 1980 stood in
excess of 200 000. The major source of this influx was the
white farms of the northern Orange Free State where rapid
mechanisation and grinding poverty initiated the relocation
of thousands of families. A smaller proportion of the
resettled people came from urban areas, where they were the
victims slum clearances and influx control measures. On
arrival in Qwaqwa, these refugees were resettled in the new
commuter town of Phuthaditjhaba (Sharp 1982; Niehaus 1989).
An inevitable consequences of this influx was that it
threw the local administration into a state of complete
anarchy. The tribal authorities, which were responsible for
managing farm refugees, were overwhelmed by the number of
people flooding into the area. As early as 1972, chiefs were
already calling on the state to halt relocation until plans
for residential development had been finalised (QLA 1972).
Under these condition it is perhaps not surprising that the
state also lost control over the economy in Qwaqwa. In fact,
by the early 1970s the BIC had come under scathing attack
for it's inability to prepare the homeland for the tens of
thousands of consumers arriving in the area. In the Qwaqwa
Legislative Assembly (1975) the BIC was dubbed 'hawk in a
sheepskin' which had come to the homeland with the sole
purpose of exploiting the local population.
As market anarchy replaced state control, the demands for a
new development corporation, which would 'serve the Basotho
people' grew louder and in 1975 the defunct BIC was replaced
with the Qwaqwa Development Corporation (QDC). This move was
of little significance, as the QDC found it impossible to
assert any control over the mushrooming second economy. The
implication of these developments was that the escalating
homeland consumer market was left in the hands of anyone who
had the resources and the inclination to exploit it. In the
early 1970s white traders and farmers were, of course, quick
to take advantage of the chaotic situation, but they were
not alone as scores of local people also set themselves up
as hawkers, backyard grocers, taximen, wood and coal
dealers, brickmakers, and shebeeners. What is significant
about this upsurge in entrepreneurial activity is that it
occurred outside the parametres of state control: it was an
organically generated process which benefitted from the fact
that very few outside entrepreneurs were aware or able to
take advantage of the new market opportunities.
In tackling this situation the state employed two tactics.
The first was to pass legislation which made the acquisi-
tion of business licenses easier for local entrepreneurs.
Thus from 1976 business licenses were issued virtually on
demand at the district magistrates offices. In the decade
between 1976 and 1986 some 400 new licenses were granted in
Qwaqwa. This democratization of licensing did very little to
control the pace or form of commercial development in the
area. It merely endorsed what had become an unmanageable de
facto situation. As far I could detect, business licenses
were issued, more or less, randomly from 1977 onwards. The
only category of actors which enjoyed priviledged access to
these resources were village chiefs.
The area where the state did intervene in the structuring
the commercial sector was in the establishment of multi-
million rand shopping complexes. To cope with persistent
consumer demand for cheap retail outlets, the QDC claimed,
that it was obliged to invite large white concerns into the
homeland. In 1980 the Qwaqwa government unveiled the first
of a series of these shopping centres, which were vehemently
opposed by local traders. Particular objections were raised
to the participation of Frasers and several other white-
owned enterprises in these ventures. The state took little
notice of these demands, and by 1985, there were six large
QDC shopping complexes in the bantustan, housing dozens of
white retail concerns and a vareity black urban traders.
This intervention, together with the unmonitored issue of
licenses, imposed severe economic pressure on all small
operators in the area.
From the above account it can be concluded that the state
played little more than a shadow role in the creation of a
commercial petty bourgeoisie in Qwaqwa. The vast majority of
entreprenuers developed no formal linkages with the state,
nor desired any, because of the unequivocal leaning of the
state towards an alliance with white capital. Moreover, it
might also be noted that the spread of white capital into
the bantustans did not completely smother local intitative,
as white concerns tended to focus only on certain segments
of rural retail market (eg. general retail, furniture and
clothing). The closure of opportunities in the 1980s did not
necessarily mean that the formerly successful entreprenuers
were forced into bankruptcy. Indeed, as I will demonstrate
later, the response to these developments were quiet varied
and depended largely the socio-cultural underpinnings of
entrepreneurship in particular cases. This being the case,
it is necessary to consider how an autonmous entrepreneurial
class was intitially constituted in Qwaqwa. Who were these
entrepreneurs? And on what basis did they set themselves up
in commerce? It is towards answering these questions that I
direct my attention in the following section of this paper.
3. Forms of Entrepreneurship:
the socio-cultural context
Most anthropological work on the issue of entrepreneurship
in African rural settings has tended to focus on the social
and cultural barriers to economic innovation, rather than on
the specific motivations of individuals and households for
pursuing strategies of economic innovation and change. Many
of the rural studies of the 1960s and early 1970s identified
a basic dichotomy between the aspirations of 'progressive'
individuals and the redistributive values of the communities
in which they lived. They argued that economic development
in these situations was only possible when individuals were
able to shrug off their social and economic obligations to
kin and neighbours (Long 1968), or were able to manipulate
customary obligations for personal gain (Barth 1967; Parkin
1972). In many respects the art of entrepreneurship in rural
Africa was the ability to walk the social tightrope between
acceptance and rejection within one's own community. It was
a process of establishing an identity which embodied both
the privileges of being an 'insider', and the freedom of
being an 'outsider' (cf. Kennedy 1988).
In African urban areas, where traditional social relations
were seen to be less binding on individuals, more attention
was given to the role of ethnicity as a basis for the
transmission of entrepreneurial values. Here, it was argued
that, in the striving for integration into the urban
economic order, ethnic identities are manipulated to enhance
access to social and economic resources (Cohen 1972). But,
as important as these studies are, they provide few useful
insights for the analysis of entrepreneurship in Qwaqwa. The
main-reasons for this is that the settlement in Qwaqwa in
the 1970s was premised on the denial of 'community1 and the
eradication of 'ethnic1 diversity. In this situation, the
social fabric of entrepreneurship was not lodged in tensions
between individuals and the values of their close-knit rural
communities, nor in the mobilization of ethnic groups around
scarce resources. The designation of Qwaqwa as a South Sotho
homeland made this difficult but not impossible (as clan was
often substituted for ethnicity in political struggles over
scarce resources). These identities, however, had 1ittle
impact on structuring entrepreneurial patterns.
The social context for entrepreneurship in Qwaqwa was the
household, which depending on the collective experience and
resources of its members, could emerge as a repository for
entrepreneurial values. These values were lodged in well-
trodden paths of resistance in a labour-repressive economy.
This emphasis on entrepreneurship as resistance has recently
been elaborated by Szelenyi (1988) in his study of market
reform in rural Hungary. In this situation, he argues that
one way of understanding the differential response of rural
people to market opportunities is through an analysis of
their individual and family histories. In his view the re-
surgence of entrepreneurship in Hungary in the 1970s cannot
be separated from the much longer-term survival strategies
of rural families under the command economy. He argues that,
with the onset of socialism in the 1950s, large numbers of
'middle peasant families' resisted socialist transformation
by clinging onto their deep-rooted desires for autonomy and
freedom to respond to market incentives. He suggests that,
with the arrival of bureaucratic socialism, these families
often consciously went into 'hiding' in the new society by
acquiring jobs which offered them 'high-levels of autonomy1
and 'freedom from state control1 (1988: 77-106, 147-59).
In adopting these strategies, Szelenyi insists, these
families aimed to avoid the stultifying effects of the two
expected career destinations: cardrification or socialist
proletarianisation. In assessing entrepreneurial responses
in the Hungarian countryside in the 1980s, Szelenyi argues
that it was precisely from within this former middle peasant
stratum that the most coherent and successful responses to
the market were formulated. This emphasis on 'hiding' and
'resistance' as the cultural bedrock of entrepreneurship in
8labour-repressive economies is, I believe, worth pursuing in
the case of Qwaqwa. It is significant because the majority
of new entrepreneurs in this bantustan were descended from,
either sharecropping families from white-owned farms, or
middle peasant household in Witsieshoek. The connections
between Szelenyi's evidence and my own seem to obvious too
ignore. In the discussion below I wi11 use Szelenyi's theory
of 're-entry into embourgeoisement' as an analytical device
for the analysis of entrepreneurship in Qwaqwa. But, I am
also not entirely satisfied with his theory, since it pays
little attention to the gender dynamics of entrepreneurial
responses, on the one hand, and the instrumental role of
household ideology in the formulation of these strategies,
on the other.
(a) Peasant-migrant entrepreneurs
The significance of cattle as a special kind of commodity,
or category of property, in African communities in southern
Africa has recently been the focus of renewed attention. In
attempting to explore the meaning of cattle among the Tshidi
of Botswana, the Comaroff's (1990) argue that cattle need to
thought of as a unique type of commodity, as a 'total social
phenomenon', which acts at multiple levels as an indicator
of wealth and a marker of status, of gender domains,
fertility and seniority etc. They believe that cattle
retain their value among the Tshidi because of their unique
ability to 'bears the imprint of social relations' and to
defy the corrosive effects of money in a rapidly changing
world (1990: 213). For the Comaroffs the historic struggle
of the Tshidi has, thus, been to 'prevent goodly beasts from
becoming mere beastly goods'; to restrict the 'Midas touch
of money', and to resist the 'implosive effects of commerce
and commodities' in their world (1990: 211).
The notion of cattle as a culturally-charged commodity has
also recently been addressed by Ferguson (1990) in his essay
on the 'bovine mystique' in Lesotho. Unlike the Comaroffs,
who are interested mainly in the iconography of cattle, he
explores the contemporary social functions and significance
of cattle in the Lesotho countryside. Ferguson argues that
male migrants still invest in cattle in Lesotho chiefly for
a reasons of social status and security. He says that male
migrants see their cattle as an essential resource not only
for its economic value, but also for its ability to 'forge
the social relationships necessary for their survival in
retirement'. Ferguson goes on to suggest that because cattle
are so centrally important to the intersts of male migrants,
they invoke a set of cultural rules which fortify cattle
against deprivation from close kin, especially women. The
most important of these cultural rules is that cattle cannot
be exchanged for cash, except under conditions of extreme
duress and economic hardship.
The patterns of rural investment identified in these case
studies were, I believed, duplicated in other areas where
peasant-migrants retained some residual access to livestock
and agriculture. In the Witsieshoek, numerous commentators
referred'to the refusal of male migrant stock owners to part
with their cattle. In Witsieshoek, the refusal of migrants
to sell their cattle was a source of regular conflict with
the white administration, and from the 1930s, special state
incentives were introduced to encourage the upgrading and
sale of livestock. The refusal of local stock owners to take
adavantages of these incentives lead to heated arguments at
the bi-annual meeting of the Witsieshoek Native Board. This
resistance to stock selling was, for instance, reflected in
the credit agreements set up by migrants at trading store in
the area. In 1950 it was reported that:
It has become recognised practise for a Native to hand
over a beast in security against purchases or debts.
With very few exceptions these animals are eventually
redeemed, but the lapse of time is often considerable.
Until they are redeemed these animals are considered to
be the property of the trader, but with a difference.
The traders is morally bound not to sell the beast to
recover his money - that's not cricket! (Roberts 1950).
Mopeli-Paulus (1956: 160) also remarked that migrant men in
the reserve were well-known for their 'natural aversion to
selling their cattle'. This became a bone of contention when
Mopeli-Paulus and other rebel leaders, opposed to the imple-
mentation of agricultural betterment in Witsieshoek, needed
funds to institute legal action against the state. He said
that they could simply not get local people to sell cattle
to support their cause. The resistance to the sale of cattle
in Witsieshoek were no different from those identified by
Ferguson for Lesotho in the 1980s. In the 1950s, cattle were
still central to the agricultural cycle and were widely used
in ploughing. They remained the main currency in bridewealth
transactions, and were the chief means through which local
cl ientel isti'c relations were formed. It was cattle, rather
than cash, that enabled men to acquire status and establish
security in retirement.
By the 1960s the pivotal social significance of cattle
waned with the introduction of tractor ploughing, which led
to the collapse of cattle-based dependency relationship and
of the mafisa (sharecropping) system (Mapena 1970: 285-315).
As cattle became increasingly disentangled from the long-
term survival strategies of migrants, there was a gradual
shift away from investment in livestock. With the renewed
threat of cattle culling in the reserve after 1950, local
stock owners began to explore alternative investments. One
option which became increasingly viable was investment in
commerce. From 1950 existing restrictions on the issuing of
trading licenses to Africans in Witsieshoek had come under
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fire, which made it possible for some Africans to acquire
trading licenses for the first time. This shift from cattle-
keeping to commerce came very slowly, and was initiated by
the working sons of older migrants. Reluctance of older men
to break'with earlier entrepreneurial patterns was a source
of frustration to the BIC, but by the late 1960s there was
an increasing tendency among local stock owners to sell off
their cattle and re-invest in commerce.
This broad pattern was also duplicated in the case of farm
families who entered Witsieshoek 'voluntarily' in the 1960s.
Many of these families moved into Qwaqwa with the specific
aim of trying to shore up their rural resources, which were
rapidly being eroded by the collapse of tenancy arrangements
on white owned farms. They were aware that white farmland
had been incorporated into the bantustan in 1964, and that
there was a possibility that they might be given land to
plough and grazing for their cattle. Evidence of this influx
was seen in the sharp rise in stock numbers in Qwaqwa in the
late 1960s - 8 299 stock units in 1966 became 10 815 units
in 1968 (Mapena 1970: 288). The escalation of this trend in
1969 forced the state to ban ex-tenants from transferring
their cattle into the bantustans in 1970.
The dreams of ex-sharecroppers and tenants of returning to
farming on a full-time basis were, however, dashed by stock
theft and the reduction of grazing and arable land space due
to relocation. Inevitably, they too, were forced to consider
new entrepreneurial strategies to cope with the rapid change
in the bantustan. And by the late 1960s and 1970s these ex-
farm workers had joined other local stock owners in shifting
their assets from cattle to commerce. In reformulating their
entrepreneurial strategies, older men were again influenced
by their working sons, who encouraged them to spread their
investments into new spheres. In a case recorded in Makwane
village, it was noted that a former stock owner, who entered
Qwaqwa from the farms in the Clarens area with 20 head of
cattle in 1964, used these resources to set up both a wood
and coal business and a general dealer store in his village
the early 1970s. In discussions with the sons of this
entrepreneur, we discovered that he was initially very
reluctant to sell his stock: 'he could not see why anyone
would be so stupid as to sell cattle to buy wood'.
The success of ex-stock owners in making the transition to
commerce depended critically on their willingness to give up
their entire herds for new pursuits. In the case of Makwane
village, mass relocation to this village in the early 1970s,
made this decision unavoidable. As shacks sprung up all over
the village, cattle-keeping became totally unmanageable. In
other villages, such as Tseseng, new arrivals came in dribs
and drabs, and as a result the pressure to sell stock was
not as great. Holding onto livestock too long, as several
cases from this village indicated, made the transition from
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cattle to commerce much more difficult. The failure of older
men to take advice from their working sons was a frequent
cause of delayed response. Late minute attempts to sell off
stock and domestic squabbles between male householders over
the appropriate allocation of financial resources was always
a recipe for failure. My argument here is, thus, that access
to cattle at the time of relocation was an important, but
not sufficient, resource for the reconstruction of older
entreprenuerial strategies. What was of great significance,
as will become evident below, was the existence of a shared
domestic ideology structured around the objectives of the
male household head.
By contrast the 'voluntary' relocations of the 1960s, the
farm removals of the 1970s were characterised by increasing
levels of coercion. Although some families continued to come
to Qwaqwa of their own accord, many more arrived as victims
of forced removal. These households were poverty-stricken on
arrival and had lost access to most, if not all, of their
residual rural resources. The sale of the few cattle these
families had left by the 1970s barely covered the costs of
relocation. In addition to the greater poverty of the later
arrivals, it was also noted that these families usually came
to Qwaqwa in smaller domestic groups. One of the reasons for
this was that some farmers only evicted individual workers
and their dependents, and not entire extended families. In
other cases the segmentation of domestic groups occurred as
a result of conflicts between older and younger men over the
desirability of resettlement. The structural weakness of
many of these relocated households, as Sharp and Spiegel
(1985) have pointed out, made them extremely vulnerable to
impoverishment after arrival.
But, despite the trauma of relocation for many, there were
others who showed great resourcefulness and ingenuity under
conditions of extreme adversity. And, by the late 1970s and
early 1980s there were dozens of these late arrivals setting
themselves up as licensed traders of one kind or another. It
is my contention that to fully understand their achievement
it is necessary, on the other hand, to grasp the strength of
their desires to exit the labour repressive migrant economy
and, on the other, to appreciate their long association with
entrepreneurial households in the white countryside. To use
Szelenyi's (1988: 67) terms they constituted people from the
right family backgrounds with the wrong life history. By
staying in the white countryside a decade too long they had
missed the critical moment at which it was still possible to
rebuild their entrepreneurial careers on the basis of rural
resources. In Hungary, Szelenyi has argued that some middle
peasant families were unable to respond to market reforms,
because they had been too eager to trade in their entrepre-
neurial skills for those of the new socialist order.
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In Qwaqwa the situation was different. Farm households had
not traded in their desire for autonomy: they had lost the
material resources needed to operationalize them. This was
illustrated by the persistent attempts of male farmworkers
to exit the command economy after arrival in Qwaqwa. In 1983
a senior TEBA official reported that Qwaqwa migrants had the
poorest rate of contract completion of all their depots in
South Africa. He said that the TEBA labour quota for the
bantustan had been reduced for this reason. In the 1970s the
failure of farmworkers to complete their contracts was also
discussed at length in the QLA, where it was noted that
workers seemed to leave their jobs without completing half
of their contracts. To stop this 'targets working*, it was
suggested that education be introduced to help workers
realise they could not break their contracts when it suited
them (QLA 1978: 231 ).
In the vast majority of cases, worker strategies to exit
the system proved totally disastrous, and within months they
were back in labour queues. But some did succeed in breaking
out of the migrant labour economy. The secret to success lay
in a variety of factors: access to a stable, well-paid
migrant job which was not abandoned prematurely; the
existence of a low household dependency ratio, and the
ability of the male household head to exert tight control
over family labour. In Qwaqwa, where women were not easily
able to find wage work, their labour could be diverted from
the domestic sphere into more productive avenues. During
fieldwork, I collected cases where women marketed consumer
goods under strict instructions from their husbands. This
practice of women trading for men was most unusual, since
petty trading was defined as women's work and the income
generated from it as their own. The ability of men to
control these activities from a distance is a mark of the
considerable power that men were able to command in the
closer settlements during the 1970s (Bank 1990).
The deployment of female labour in pursuit of male profits
was, however, not confined to retailing. In the local brick
manufacturing sector, rural men were also able to translate
domestic power into profits. On the brickmaking sites which
mushroomed along the banks of the Namhadi river in the early
1970s men set their families to work in a way reminiscent of
the family work teams employed in the Lancaster coalpits of
nineteenth century England (Seccombe 1985). The difference
was that men did less of the physical work at the Qwaqwa
brickyards. The division of labour was strictly along lines
of age and gender with women and children doing the bulk of
the digging, carting and moulding of clay into bricks. Men,
to the extent that they were present at the production site
at all, took responsibility for overseeing labour and for
securing contracts for the supply of raw materials, such as
the coal needed for baking. In the mid-1970s, when the state
closed the brickyards, some of the most successful of these
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entrepreneurs had worked themselves into a position where
they could move into building contracting or retailing on a
ful1-time basis.
By cobbling together savings in various ways some ex-farm
workers maneouvered themselves into a position where they
were eligible for business licenses. While men continued to
work in the cities, women and children baked bricks and took
charge of the building arrangements. This ability of former
farm workers, who arrived in Qwaqwa with modest resources in
the 1970s, to set themselves up in business derived in no
small measure from their extraordinary control over family
labour. Their ability to capitalize on the abundant
opportunities for commerce in the closer settlements derived
not only from their location within these settlements during
the 1970s, but also from their ability to resuscitate older
notions of the patriarchal family rooted in a bygone era of
independence in the white countryside. The unique ability of
ex-farm workers to combine household resource behind single-
minded male objective enabled some men to achieve remarkable
success in commerce during the 1970s.
In the above discussion I have identified the two dominant
forms of entrepreneurship in Qwaqwa in the 1970s. Both, as I
have tried to indicate, were structured around the cultural
and material resources rural people brought with them at the
time of relocation. In the first case I described how, under
pressure from their migrant sons, older men with small herds
of cattle reshaped their earlier entrepreneurial strategies
to meet the changing conditions in Qwaqwa. In the second, I
explained that, even without cattle, it was still possible
for rural households to take hold of market opportunities in
Qwaqwa in the 1970s because of the paucity of licensed
traders in the villages and the ability of male household
heads to exploit domestic labour. The considerable success
of these operators in the 1970s was borne out by the fact
they made up over 90* of all licensed traders in Qwaqwa in
1980.
(b) Worker entrepreneurs
If it can be concluded from the above discussion that
peasant-migrant households were successful in capitalizing
on market opportunities in Qwaqwa in the 1970s, it is also
necessary to understand why urban households, relocated at
the same time, were so under-represented is this new class.
This is especially perplexing since urban households were
usually much better off than their rural counterparts. Part
of the reason, I believe, lies in the fact that relocated
urban workers had travelled much further down the road of
proletarianisation than then r rural counterparts. They had
set out on what Szelenyi (1988) would call 'proletarian
trajectories'. In other words, they were more concerned with
trying to improve their position from within the command
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economy than outside it. This was demonstrated by the fact
that the urban workers in Phuthaditjhaba often viewed forced
relocation to Qwaqwa as a minor setback in their overall
strategies to become fully urbanised workers. This obser-
vation is supported by Niehaus (1987), who shows that urban
workers displayed great competence and dexterity in shifting
around in the labour market.
To translate this observation into conceptual terms, it
might be useful to view these urban relocations to Qwaqwa as
early examples of 'displaced urbanisation' (Murray 1987).
This concept is used specifically to refer to the process by
which 'rural1 workers, through unionization and state reform
in the 1980s, were re-integrated into the urban economy. The
vehicle for this integration, according to Murray, was easy
access to metropolitan labour market through commuting. Now,
although Qwaqwa is not close to major metropolitan areas, it
is clear from our evidence that male urban workers did enjoy
priviledged access to urban employment. There were two main
reasons for this: firstly, they lived at the doorstep of the
only functional labour bureaux in the bantustan; secondly,
they were able to manipulate their prior social connections
in urban areas to secure work. These factors elevated male
urban workers to the status of a "labour aristocracy' in the
bantustan. As far as access to the urban labour market was
concerned, these workers stood in a fundamentally different
structural position to their counterparts in the villages.
The point which needs emphasis here is that urban workers,
by contrast to rural migrants, were connected to urban areas
through multiple social and economic bonds. The worlds they
created for themselves, consequently, extended outwards from
Phuthaditjhaba and not inwards to the centres of village
life. In fact, few even acknowledged the existence of the
vast mass of rural poor. By structuring their lives around
exiting the bantustan, rather than the labour market, it is
not at all surprising that they adopted a much more cautious
attitude towards the market opportunities inside Qwaqwa. One
of the problems with applying Murray's notion of 'displaced
urbanization' to workers in Phuthaditjhaba is that it is
insensitive to the gendered nature of the labour market.
That urban men in Qwaqwa were able to retain access urban
opportunities from behind the bantustan borders, does not
mean that their wives or sisters in Phuthaditjhaba shared
their experiences or aspirations.
The views of male workers in Phuthaditjhaba were seldom
shared by their wives, who found it virtually impossible to
acquire wage work in the 1970s. There were simply no jobs
for them at the labour offices. The few opportunities open
to them in the commuter sector were also unrewarding. Unlike
their husbands, urban women were imprisoned by poverty and
patriarchy. In coping with their subordination and boredom
as discarded wives, many were inclined to view petty trading
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as one way of restoring their self-respect and independence,
lost through relocation. These desires were, however, always
balanced against the threat of losing male remittances if
they were seen to be behave in an 'unwifely' fashion.
The claim that gender relations in working class households
were fraught with tensions, is born out by Niehaus' (1989)
research in the Diapollo section of the town. By the early
1980s the divorce rates in this part of the town had soared
to above 50X and domestic violence was endemic. The involve-
ment-of married women in trading activities was one source
of dispute as women argued that they were being forced into
commerce because their husbands were not fulfilling their
role as breadwinners. Men, on the other hand, said that they
could not tolerate their wives hanging around on the streets
if they were away in the cities. This struggle over gender
roles and anxieties of absent men over female sexuality,
made it difficult for married women to succeed in commerce
during the 1970s.
But there is one category of urban women which demands
special attention: the single mothers, who were not beholden
to male wages and domination. These estranged wives, widows,
and unmarried mothers were core participants in the highly
lucrative urban shebeen trade. In this sector there was no
male involvement, and it was completely dominated by single
mothers, many of whom had plied their trade for years prior
to relocation. Some of these operators had brewed beer since
they were teenagers and had learnt an impressive repertoire
of recipes. The success of these Phuthaditjhaba shebeeners
was aided in the 1970s by the South African Liquor Board's
refusal to issue bottlestore licenses in Qwaqwa. The rever-
sal of this restriction in 1980 had a devastating impact on
the homebrew shebeens in the 1980s, since it democratized
access to the to liquor trade.
What is significant about the shebeen trade in the 1970s
was that, like the rural retail sector, it flourished on the
basis of household rather than state resources. In fact, the
sale of liquor from home remained strictly illegal in Qwaqwa
until 1989. The difference between the two sectors lay only
in the fact that urban shebeeners relied on a 'matriarchal'
domestic ideology, rather than a patriarchal one. The main
problem for shebeeners was, however, that they had access to
only the labour of their children, who were often too young
to take on responsibility for dealing with clients and
managing money. Moreover, brewing gallon drums of beer daily
was much more labour intensive than retailing, and could
not be left in the hands of children. It was for this reason
that these women found it difficult to survive without addi-
tional assistance. Their first port of call was close kins-
women, but if this did not work out, shebeeners recruited
schoolgirls as apprentices. It was easy to recruit these
young women because of the shortage of hostel accommodation
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in the bantustan. These girls, who came from a variety of
destinations outside Qwaqwa, were not paid for their labour,
but were always given free food and accommodation.
By the mid-1970s this practice was causing hysteria in the
Qwaqwa Legislative Assembly, where constant reference was
made to the way 'liberated landladies' corrupted young girls
living in Qwaqwa without parental guidance. One speaker
demanded that the Qwaqwa government take immediate action to
prevent flive-inf relationships. He stated that these girls:
...stay at the place where a widowed landlady brews
home-made beer. In the end they turn into drunkards and
help the landlady brew the beer. When you ask them when
they are going to school, they will say that they have
"homework" to do and it must be done where they are...
But, when you look at them closely, you will find that
their eyes are red, and they are drunk (QLA 1975: 252).
This speaker's point was to acknowledge the power of
domestic ideology and values in the organization of this
sector. The girls he was referring to had, after all, been
so subverted by their 'landladys' that they did not even go
to school.
In the above discussion I have tried to argue that there
were two main reason why market responses were so stunted in
Phuthaditjhaba in the 1970s. Firstly, I have contended that
urban workers were much less inclined to try and 'exit' the
labour market than their rural counterparts because of their
superior access to urban resources and their aspirations to
eventually return to these areas. Secondly, I have suggested
that, while men clung tenaciously to these ideals, urban
women tended to have their own agendas. This resulted in
exceptionally high-levels of gender conflict in these house-
holds and inhibited the Tatter's ability to make significant
progress in commerce. The major exception to this trend was
single women, who by force of necessity and compulsion, took
hold of urban market opportunities with both hands.
(c) Bureaucrat entrepreneurs
In his study of Hungary, Szelenyi (1988) argues that rapid
bureaucratization in this society since the 1950s has placed
severe limitation on entrepreneurship. The major reason for
this, he contends, is that in the process of 'cadrefication'
bureaucrats and party officials were stripped of their prior
cultural orientations towards autonomy. The new skills they
had acquired under socialism were those of 'social domina-
tion' (1998: 71). For Szelenyi's, the rural cadre in Hungary
is not interested in investing his time and money in market
pursuits. He is more concerned with improving his position
and status within the party machinery by devoting his
energies to bureaucratic duties and by ensuring that he
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possesses the material trappings incumbent on his position.
In seeking this status, cadres took great pride in their
homes and material possessions. They were, for instance,
seen to devote their productive land to carefully manicured
lawns, while their entrepreneurial neighbours would use this
space for market gardening. Szelenyi (1988) central argument
is that in their quest for security and status cadres were
always willing 'to exchange autonomy for authority1 (1986:
263).
Szelenyi (1988) is, of course, not alone in pointing out
the deadening effects of bureaucratization on entrepreneur-
ship. But is his perspective useful for our understanding of
the bantustans? Graaf (1990) would suggest not, since he is
of the opinion that state positions in the bantustans are
constantly abused for private accumulation of wealth. It is,
he postulates, precisely because 'social classes are so
poorly developed in these areas1 that state functionaries
use their positions as a vehicle for private profiteering
(1990: 170). This process, he insists, has been encouraged
by the lack of interest shown in the bantustans by the urban
black bourgeoisie. Thus, 'the crystallization of bourgeois
classes has, contrary to the apparent intention of official
policy, been extruded from the bantustans1 (1990: 170).
On the basis of extensive interaction with bureaucrats and
teachers in Qwaqwa during the 1980s, I believe that neither
position offers an accurate depiction of the aspirations and
economic strategies of civil servants in Qwaqwa. In relation
to Szelenyi's observations it need only be pointed out that
civil servants in the bantustan, unlike those in Hungary or
other former socialist countries, were not required to
undergo intensive politically and ideological instruction
before they could take up state positions. They were
accepted into the state machinery immediately after school,
or college, and were not political re-educated after taking
up their positions. This caused concern within the ruling
Dikwankwetla party, and in 1982 the Chief Minister was so
enraged by the lack of support received from civil servants
that he threatened to 'appoint supporters of the government
into the civil service, even if they are inefficient' (QLA
1982: 453).
Entry into the state structure was thus driven by factors
other than political commitment. The majority of bureau-
crats, as I encountered them, were either covertly or more
outpokenly opposed to the system that they worked for. Many
said they had entered government service in the homeland
because they found it difficult to acquire white collar jobs
in common South Africa. To cope with the contradictions of
working within the system, bureaucrats and teachers tended
to separate their public and their private personae. At
public occasions they would pay due tribute to senior party
officials, while in private they would chastise and ridicule
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party members and mock the inefficiency and wastefulness of
the Mope "I i government.
But, despite the considerable pride taken by bureaucrats in
their ability to play this two-faced game, they were often
more wrapped up in the system than they were prepared to
acknowledge. The recurring themes in conversations with
civil servants were revealing. The two main issues that
received almost obsessive attention were those of nepotism
and inefficiency. The fact that a chief without a university
degree or teaching diploma could be elevated to the post of
Minister of Education was a common point of departure for
attacks on the Qwaqwa government. 'Mopeii', it was so often
said, 'should know better than this, he used to be a school
inspector himself. These discussions seemed to suggest that
the Qwaqwa government was illegitimate, not because it prop-
ped up an indefensible political system, but because it was
responsible for squandering resources and did not accept
1
 rational' bureaucratic procedures.
But, if Graaf (1990) is right, why should bureaucrats care
whether the system works efficiently or not? Would a corrupt
system not serve them better than an efficient one? It would
seem to me that one of the reasons civil servants expressed
such concerns was precisely because these corrupt practices
presented an affront their sense of self-identity. Austin
(1984) in her study of middle class households in Kingston,
Jamaica, was struck by the extent to which civil servants
propagated what she calls an 'ideology of education1. The
hallmark of this ideology was an 'appeal to superiority
through education and qualification1 (1984: 214). Austin
(1984) says that the hegemony of this ideology in Jamaica
was a product of the extent to which it had been absorbed by
working-class people as well. The reason for the pervasive-
ness of this set of beliefs, she believes, was that entre-
preneurship remained such a poor alternative to education as
a source of upward mobility. Most of the opportunities for
accumulation in the Jamaican economy were controlled by
foreigners. Entrepreneurship was accordingly, she suggests,
a career option pursued 'when one failed to achieve at
schoolf (1984: 219).
In Qwaqwa I encountered a similar 'ideology of education'.
Bureaucrats and teachers constantly referred to education as
the factor which distinguished them from the unsophisticated
'farm people* of the villages, as well as from elements of
the urban working class in Qwaqwa. They firmly believed that
education was the only reliable route to long-term success.
In the 1980s there was not a single teacher or civil servant
that I got to know well that was not registered for a degree
or diploma. But education was more than a window to economic
success, it was the manner in which civil servants expressed
their urban identity and connected themselves with the urban
middle class outside the bantustan. One manifestation of
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this was the eagerness of middle-ranking bureaucrats to buy
property in common South Africa after 1984. Civil servants
were seen to spend large parts of their monthly salaries on
keeping these contacts alive.
If civil servants in Qwaqwa embraced a ideology similar to
that ofas their Jamaican counterparts, they did not attach
any stigma to the pursuit of private profit. In the 1970s
their access to the market limited by a Qwaqwa government
decree which prohibited civil servants from owning busines-
ses.' This did not prevent civil servants from trying to earn
money by illegal means. But it was only after 1980, when
this ruling was overlooked, that civil servants began to
play a more active role in commerce. One popular strategy
was for a bureaucrat to apply for business in his wife's
name and to allow her to run and manage the concern while he
was away at work. Another was to put down a deposit on a
kombi taxi and to employ a driver to run the tax:. The
preference of civil servants was, however, for hcme-based
activities such aa spaza shops or shebeens which were easily
combined with a working life-style. One striking feature
about these concerns which separated them from tnose in the
closer settlements was the high-level of co-operation
between men and women in both formulating business
strategies and bringing them to fruition. Men invariably
held the reigns of domestic power, but gave their wives a
freehand in managing and even controlling the business
finances.
The striking point about the involvement of bureaucrats in
commerce was that entrepreneurship was so seldom considered
as an viable alternative career option. Indeed, very few
civil servants contemplated giving up their gove-nment jobs
to go into business on a full-time basis. The desirability
of commerce in these cases lay in its ability to increase
the household consumption, and to enhance the status, of
civil servants among their peers. This orientation was seen
in the limited extent to which teachers and bureaucrats re-
invested their profits in expanding their businesses.
Profits were more often directed towards consumption items
such as luxury cars, better houses and improved education
for their children. In the bureaucracy, entrepreneurship was
not seen as a realistic alternative to government
employment, it was essentially a form of wage subsidy
employed to enhance the purchasing power of state salaries.
This point is illustrated in the following case study: TM,
a skilled technician with the Department of Works had earned
extra income drawing plans for renovations to state houses
in Phuthaditjhaba since his arrival in Qwaqwa in 1975. His
technical competence in this field won him a reputation as
the 'best amateur architect' in the town, and by the early
1980s he bragged that 'the way things were going now, my
government salary will be nothing more than pocket money*.
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By the mid-1980s, opportunities in TM's field of expertise
improved further with the issuing of state housing subsidies
to black civil servants. He now had more than enough clients
to take on a full-time career as an architect and building
contractor. But in 1985, when TM was poised for take-off, he
decided to return to university to improve his education. He
clearly felt achieving an additional qualification was more
valuable than the income he could earn in business over the
same period.
In-conclusion, I would like to make a few brief remarks
about Graaf's (1990) reference to the apparent reluctance of
the black urban bourgeoisie to open businesses in the bantu-
stans. In Qwaqwa, this was simply not the case as there was
sustained interest in the area by urban entrepreneurs from
the early 1980s. This was evident in the transport trade,
where urban taxi associations did their uttermost to corner
the rural market, but there was also much interest in the
retail sector, where general dealer stores were increasingly
being bought up by city traders. These operators also tried
to capitalize on QDC offers for premises and loans. Perhaps
predictably, the urban black bourgeoisie increasingly joined
large white companies, such as Spar and Frasers, as the main
beneficiaries of massive state investment in the bantustan's
commercial sector. This influx of highly capitalised entre-
preneurs into the retail market in Qwaqwa in the 1980s put
tremendous strain on peasant-migrant entreprenuers who had
made their mark in this sector in the 1970s. In the final
part of this paper, I will consider some responses from the
latter owners to the changes of the 1980s.
4. New Problems, Old Idioms:
restructuring in the rural sector
The pressures imposed by external competition had a
devastating effect on the rural retail sector. In the 1980s
it is estimated that a third of the general dealers* stores
in the villages were pushed out of business. This collapse
was caused, on the one hand, by the growth of'QDC shopping
complexes, and on the other, by uneconomic licensing proce-
dures which caused chronic overtrading. The rate at which
rural profits fell varied according to the size of the
store, its location in relation to new stores, and its
distance from Phuthaditjhaba. Whatever the combina-tion of
factors, general retailers were faced with the stark choice
of adapting their operators to suit new conditions, or to
face bankruptcy. In this section of the paper, I wi11 not
dwell on the latter outcome. The dominant trend among
smaller owners was towards increasing self-exploitation in
an effort to stave off re-entry into the labour market. This
response to the economic pressures showed quite remarkable
similarities to the way in which sharecroppers had responded
to change on the white farms several decades earlier.
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Keegan (1988) notes that when sharecroppers were forced to
enter labour tenancy agreements by white farmers, they sent
their sons out to work first and withheld their own labour
for as long as possible. Many older, illiterate storekeepers
employed precisely this tactic by using household dependants
as a barrier to their own (re)proletarianization. The road
back into the proletariat was consequently not a rapid one,
and it often took years to complete. This was brought home
to me on a recent fieldtrip, where I was amazed to discover
how many of the rural traders who had declared themselves
bankrupt in 1985 were still in business. These owners were
poor and demoralised, but they were determined not to have
to return to the labour market. In the emotive words of one
storekeeper: 'I would rather die than have to work for the
white man again. You can see I have little left, so I will
not 1ive long'.
But, if many fell victim to the pressures of overtrading,
there were others who were successfully adapting to the new
conditions. In coping with escalting competition, they were
reworking older practices to achieve new objectives. One of
the most common ways of dealing with overtrading was through
diversification (or risk spreading). This occasionally took
the form of branching out into more specialised markets, but
more often it meant hiring out a second general store from a
struggling owners and simply shifting stock from location to
another.
Long and Roberts (1984) have noted the centrality of risk-
speading to the entrepreneurial strategies of Peruvian
peasant-migrants. They suggest that one of the ways in which
these entrepreneurs survive changes in the highland economy
is by linking their households together through kinship into
'confederations' which span from Lima into remote corners of
the agrarian highlands. By constructing commercial chains of
this kind, peasant-migrants were able to retain a firm hold
on the rural consumer market. In Qwaqwa, diversification
always occurred within managable geographical limits. There
was no attempt to develop for elaborate alliances between
kin, such as characterised the Peruvian case, and as far as
possible storekeepers tried to limit diversification to
within the framework of existing household relations. Their
strategies were clearly structured around a defence of the
patriarchal family firm.
The significance of this response was that it set out to
accommodate new management priorities within the context of
an older ideological forms. This emphasis on the integrity
of the kin group was clearly shown in the lengths to which
traders were prepared to go to avoid employing non-kin in
their business. Traders always justified this choice of kin
on the grounds that kin were more reliable, trustworthy and
obedient than non-kin. And, when storekeepers were unable to
acquire kin to work for them, they frequently attempted to
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construct quasi-kin relationships, despite the fact that the
cost of building up these relations far exceded the expense
of employing wage labour labour from the villages. Owners
justified these decisions on the grounds that in the long-
run, quasi-kin would prove more valuable and reliable. than
waged labour.
These views were, however, sometimes contradicted in the
life experiences of traders. The case of GN, shopkeeper and
soccer club owner in Tseki village, demonstrates this point
rather well. Like many other general dealers, GN experienced
a sharp fall in profits in his store after 1980 and, when he
heard that the QDC was planning a shopping complex less than
a mile away, he decided to look for premises elsewhere. In
1983, he moved half of his stock over to a hired store in a
neighbouring village. He instructed his wife to take charge
of his Tseki business and to allow a 16 year old boy, whom
they had 'taken in', to help her out. GN said that he viewed
this boy as 'if he was my own son and trusted him fully'. In
1984 the trust and responsiblity bestowed on this boy back-
fired when he let a youth gang in to ransack the store late
one night. When I interviewed GN in 1985 he was mortified by
this betrayal. In 1991 I returned to Nyembe's store and
found him in a similar frame of mind. He explained that
after the tragic events of 1984, he had decided to take in
another young boy and his sister and had again 'treated them
like family', but they too had conspired against him and, in
1990, had robbed him of R2500.
This tendency of family-based enterprises to resist the
commoditization of 'relations in production' (Buroway 1985)
has recently generated lively debate in the field of peasant
studies. Much of this debate centres on whether family farms
can retain their 'non-capitalist' (subsistence) character in
the presence of wage contracts. Goodman and Redclift (1985)
believe that family enterprises are irreversibly transformed
as soon as wage labour makes an appearance. They suggest
that the 'logic' of production must change once 'household
relations' become 'class relations'. Friedman (1986), on the
other hand, has argued that family farms only become 'fully
commoditized' when the wage form assumes a dominant position
within the enterprise. She says that wage and non-wage forms
can easily co-exist in family enterprises, without affecting
their character. This literature raises important questions
about the 'capitalist' character of rural stores which can-
not be addressed here.
The important point, for the purposes of our discussion,
is that the defence of the patriarchal family enterprise in
the closer settlements greatly limited the options open to
rural retailers in their responses to changing market condi-
tions. By operating in the confines of a restrictive kin
ideology, these entrepreneurs resisted adaptations to their
enterprise that would have made them more competitive. In
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1980, T. K. Mopeli launched into a scathing attack on the
rural retail sector on precisely these grounds:
It is customary for us blacks to be wery proud of
owning a small cafe. He will say, 'Ye6, I am the owner
of this cafe because it belongs to me, I am the owner1,
but will not attempt to expand this business... I feel
that with the passage of time our people will realise
the necessity of large businesses (QLA 1980: 247)
He accused village traders of following a 'philosophy of one
man, one shop' and said they that were shooting themselves
in the foot by obstinately refusing to set up partnerships.
What Mopeli failed to realise was that the kind of expansion
and growth he recommended was not possible as long as
entreprenuership in the closer settlements remained locked
in a patriarchal, family-based form. In terms of the
prevailing ideology, it was considered anathema for rural
traders to set up business partnerships with strangers. It
was also extremely difficult to build up 'large businesses1,
when the size and efficiency of the labour force was
determined by its relationship to the household head.
To survive the onslaught of white supermarkets and urban
black entrepreneurs, peasant migrant entrepreneurs in the
closer settlements had instead of devising new business
techniques had turned back to their older tactics of risk
spreading and self-exploitation which are acknowledged as
basic peasant responses to social change and economic crisis
(Scott 1977). But by turning back to older idioms, these
entrepreneurs also made some wise decisions. One of these
decisions was to force their stores to 'bear the imprint of
social relations' (in much the same was as their cattle had
done prior to relocation) by using credit as a strategy for
survival. By recasting market relationships in the social
fabric of clientelism, some rural traders were able to
rescue themselves from certain failure. The economic risks
of personalising business transactions were immense, since
few rural households had access to the secure wege earnings
needed to serve credit agreements. Howvere, if credit was
properly managed by storekeepers, it could yield impressive
results. Some of the most successful rural retailers, I
interviewed in the 1980s, saw credit as a key mechanism to
hold onto clients which would ordinarily have spent their
earnings at the new cheap supermarket outlets.
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Conclusion
The major aim of this paper has been to demonstrate the
pitfalls of assuming that processes of class differentiation
in the bantustans are best explained through an analysis of
state programmes and policies. I have challenged this view
by focussing on the role of household resources, ideologies
and experiences in shaping rural entrepreneurship in Qwaqwa
during the 1970s and 1980s. In developing this argument, I
have'drawn inspiration from the detailed work of Szelenyi
(1988) on entreprenuership in socialist Hungary, and have
made a claim for the comparative value of his research for
our understanding of rural South Africa. In concluding, I
would like to return to my introduction and ask what this
analysis tells us about social class in the bantustans?
Ferguson (1990), in a recent attack on the objectification
of "economic classes" as significant social and political
categories in rural South Africa, has argued that a more
useful way of tackling the question of rural differentiation
is by attempting to identify 'categories of interest*. In
his ethnography, Ferguson uses this concept to signpost and
analyse cross-cutting power relations and property domains
in rural households. He also sets out to identify some of
the struggles that emerge around the protection of these
domains. His analysis of the 'bovine mystique1 derives from
this approach.
In his more theoretical writing, Ferguson (1988) argues
that, if one is to engage in the 'recovery of dead gods', it
is to Weber that we might look for inspiration. The silence
on Abner Cohen (1974; 1980) here is surprising since it is
he more than any other recent anthropologist who has made
constant use the notion of 'interest groups1 in his various
ethnographic studies of elite groups in West Africa. Cohen
(1974: 17) as also unashamedly opposed to class analysis as
this well-known passage indicates:
Classes are a figment of the imagination of sociolo-
gists. What actually exists are large numbers of
interest groups of different scales and political
significance, which can range on one continuum, from
the most formally organised to the most informally
organised, with most interest groups falling in
between..
Although unacknowledged, this emphasis on interest groups,
rather than classes has increasingly crept into studies of
rural politics in the South African bantustans. Ritchken
(1989), for instance, tells us that the notion of a rural
petty bourgeoisie in South Africa cannot be sustained since
groups of elites (defined by occupation) have their own set
of 'interests' and are likely to structure their political
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responses and alliances around these interests. Ferguson's
(1990) reference to 'interests' is, of course, different 1n
that he makes no a priori claim that people who share
similar interests will necessarily form groups. His point 1s
rather that there are various categories of interests which
can sharpen social and political identities. My argument
follows similar lines. I have suggested that entrepreneurs
in Qwaqwa can be categorised in terms a common set of life
experiences, interests and aspirations, but do not make any
claim that the categories of interest identified above will
necessarily form the basis for collective political action.
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